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THE INCOHERENCE BETWEEN RAWLS'S
THEORIES OF JUSTICE
Thomas W. Pogge*
Would it be desirable to reform the global institutional order in
conformity with the principles Rawls defends in A Theory of Justice?
Rawls himself denies this and proposes a different moral theory
(The Law of Peoples) for the relations among self-governing
peoples. While sharing a questionable, purely recipient-oriented
approach, his two theories differ importantly in substance and
structure. The former gives weight only to the interests of individual
persons, yet the latter gives no weight to these interests at all. The
former theory is three-tiered and institutional, centering on a public
criterion of justice that is justified through a contractualist thought
experiment and in turn justifies particular institutional arrangements
and reforms under variable empirical circumstances. Yet, the latter
theory is two-tiered and interactional, deploying a contractualist
thought experiment to justify rigid rules of good conduct for
peoples. Poorly motivated, these asymmetries help Rawls's anticosmopolitan case. But they fail to vindicate his claim that global
economic justice demands only a modest "duty of assistance."
INTRODUCTION

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls offers his account of domestic
justice, meant to provide moral guidance for the assessment, design,
and reform of the institutional order ("basic structure") of one
society.
Twenty-eight years later, he published a work on
international justice: The Law of Peoples, which he presents as an
extension of his domestic theory.
Central to both texts are thought experiments involving a fictional
deliberative forum, the "original position," composed of rational
deliberators, or "parties." In the domestic case, the parties represent
individual persons. As each prospective citizen has his or her own
representative, this original position is said to model the freedom and
fundamental equality of all persons. The parties have the task to
agree on a public criterion of justice for assessing alternative feasible
* Columbia University, Department of Philosophy. Professor Pogge is the author of
Realizing Rawls (1989) and has written numerous important papers in ethics and
moral and political philosophy, especially on global justice and on the work of Rawls
and Kant.
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basic structures for a society. The parties aim to protect the interests
of their respective clients.
All distinguishing features of these
prospective citizens are, however, concealed by a "veil of ignorance"
from the parties, who must reach agreement on a public criterion of
social justice without knowing their clients' particular creeds, values,
tastes, desires, and endowments, or even the natural and historical
context of their clients' society. On the basis of a highly complex
array of rigorous arguments, Rawls tries to demonstrate that the
parties would select his liberal public criterion: the two principles of
justice with the two priority rules.'
In the international case, the thought experiment of the original
position is deployed rather differently. Four divergences spring to
mind. The rational deliberators are conceived as representing peoples
rather than persons, and the international original position is thus said
to model the freedom and equality of peoples. Representation is
selectively granted only to peoples who are well-ordered by having
either a liberal or a decent domestic institutional order, while the
remainder ("outlaw states," "burdened societies," and "benevolent
absolutisms") are not accepted as equals and thus denied equal
respect and tolerance.' The veil of ignorance is thin enough to allow
the parties to know whether they are representing a liberal or a decent
people; and Rawls therefore conducts his international thought
experiment twice to show separately that representatives of liberal
peoples and representatives of decent peoples would independently
join the same agreement. And the task assigned to the parties in the
international original position is importantly disanalogous; they are
not, as one might have expected, charged with agreeing on a public
criterion for the assessment, design, and reform of the global
institutional order, but charged with agreeing on a set of rules of good
conduct that cooperating peoples should (expect one another to)
obey.
I will discuss the first and the last of these more obvious divergences
as well as a less obvious one that is also of some importance. First,
however, let me comment briefly on the general approach that both
theories share in common.
I. THE PURELY RECIPIENT-ORIENTED APPROACH EXEMPLIFIED BY
BOTH THEORIES

However diverse in various respects, contractualist thought
experiments of the kind Rawls is conducting express a purely
recipient-oriented ("PRO") approach to moral questions. The PRO
approach can best be defined informationally: Those who advocate a
PRO approach to some moral question believe that its correct
1. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 266-67 (rev. ed. 1999).
2. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples 4, 63 (1999).
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solution is found and justified by comparing how the feasible
alternative solutions would affect those relevantly affected by the
choice of solution-the "recipients" of the choice. One solution is
better than another if and only if it is better for these recipients. All
other information is deemed irrelevant.
Any PRO theory is triadic, involving:
1) A iudicandum, that which is to be judged morally;
2) Recipients, whose perspective informs the judgment; and
3) Interests that characterize these recipients, identifying what
counts as goods or ills for them and how such goods and ills are to
be aggregated both within and across recipients.
The General Triadic
Structure of PRO
Moral Theories
Indicandum:

Rawls's Domestic
Theory

Rawls's International
Theory

What is the morally

What are the morally

What is the moral

best public criterion

best rules of conduct

question? What is to

of justice for the

that states (peoples)

be judged in moral
terms?

comparative
assessment of
alternative feasible
designs for the
institutional order
("basic structure") of
a self-contained
(national) society?

should (expect one
another to) honor?

The individual
citizens of the society
in question

Liberal and decent
peoples

Recipients:

Who are the affected
parties by reference
to whose interests the
judgment is to be
made?
Interests:

ills)?

three "higher-order
interests"

Interests in its
independence,
equality, and the
stability of its liberal
or decent domestic
order

Intra-recipient
aggregation

left unspecified

left unspecified

Inter-recipient
aggregation

maximin (and
averaging)

left unspecified
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I reject the PRO approach in general-mainly, though not
exclusively, because it considers only how recipients are affected by a
particular iudicandum, as opposed to how they are being treated by
this iudicandum. PRO theorizing considers merely how recipients are
faring and thereby ignores the particular causal pathways on which
goods and ills arrive at particular recipients. That this is implausible is
easy to see in the assessment of persons and their conduct, where it
often matters morally whether the agent's conduct was a bringingabout or a failing-to-prevent. Less obviously, the PRO approach is
implausible also in the assessment of social rules by giving no more
weight, for instance, to harms these rules mandate or authorize than
to equivalent harms these rules merely fail to prevent or to mitigate.
The problem is well exemplified in Rawls's domestic theory by the
first priority rule3 and the examples he gives to illustrate its meaning
and application. The first priority rule permits restricting the basic
liberties for the sake of making them effectively exercisable and more
secure. Thus Rawls writes that liberty of conscience may be restricted
by the state insofar as this is the only way to avoid disruptions of
public order that would endanger the liberty of all-decisive in this
case is "the interest of the representative equal citizen" in her basic
liberties.4 He shows that the freedom of intolerant sects may be
restricted "when the tolerant sincerely and with reason believe that
their own security and that of the institutions of liberty are in
danger."5 And he affirms that extra votes may be given to intelligent
and well-educated citizens when doing so, through better government,
sufficiently enhances the security of the non-political basic liberties of
the uneducated: "Admitting these assumptions, plural voting may be
perfectly just."6
The greatest paradoxes appear when Rawls applies his PRO
approach to the design of the penal system and endorses, for instance,
strict liability criminal statutes for contexts where the restriction of
basic liberties they involve is outweighed by the reduction they
achieve in the danger to the basic liberties from non-compliance:
"Citizens may affirm the law as the lesser of two evils, resigning
themselves to the fact that while they may be held guilty for things
they have not done, the risks to their liberty on any other course
would be worse." 7 With analogous reasoning, one could justify
relaxing the constraints on the pursuit and interrogation of suspects,
lowering standards of evidence in criminal trials, and imposing
Draconian punishments for offenses (like drunk driving) that, though

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1, at 266.
Id. at 187.
Id. at 193.
Id. at 205.
Id. at 213.
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non-malicious, are quite harmful and can be substantially cut back
through deterrence.
Reflection on the penal system makes evident how the PRO
approach is defective: As recipients, we may indeed not care whether
our basic liberties are endangered by harms that are mandated or
authorized by our institutional order and inflicted by state officials or
by harms that are insufficiently prevented and deterred by our
institutional order and inflicted by criminals and private persons. But
as politically responsible citizens, who participate in imposing this
institutional order on others, we do give greater weight to harms that
are officially inflicted ("in the name of the people")-such as
punishments of the innocent under strict-liability criminal statutes or
Draconian punishments-than to harms that are thereby avoidable.
The PRO approach reflects only the first of these perspectives. An
adequate conception of social justice must balance both.
Having briefly expressed my reservations about the PRO
approach,8 which Rawls's domestic and international theories share in
common, let me now turn to some of the divergences. For Rawls,
these differences between his two PRO theories demonstrate the
"versatility" and "flexibility" of his original position.9 I see them as
unexplained asymmetries that further damage the credibility of his
international theory.
II. THE EXCLUSIVE CONCERN FOR THE INTERESTS OF PEOPLES
Much attention has already been paid to the fact that Rawls puts so
much moral weight on the notion of a people. This notion is marred
by a double vagueness. First, it is unclear what groups are to count as
peoples. Does Rawls want to count any group of persons residing
together within the territorial boundaries of a state? What about the
Kurds, the Jews, the Chechens, the Maori, the Sami, and hundreds of
other traditional and aboriginal nations, which often transcend state
borders or are nested within one another? Secondly, it is unclear how
each of the recognized peoples is delimited. Is this decided by
passport, culture, descent, choice, or any combination of these and
perhaps other criteria? Can persons belong to several peoples or to
one at most?
All these questions would assume considerable
importance in any attempt to realize the "Society of Peoples" Rawls
envisions as his "realistic utopia." And yet, he pays no attention to
them at all.
8. These reservations are more fully stated in Thomas W. Pogge, Three Problems
with Contractarian-Consequentialist
Ways of Assessing Social Institutions, Soc. Phil. &
Pol'y, Summer 1995, at 241, and in The Just Society 241, 241-66 (Ellen Frankel Paul et
al. eds., 1995); Thomas W. Pogge, Responsibilities for Poverty-Related Ill Health,
Ethics & Int'l Aff., Nov. 13, 2002, at 71-79; Thomas W. Pogge, Equal Freedom for
All?, 28 Midwest Stud. in Phil. (forthcoming 2004).
9. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 2, at 40, 86.
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It has also been frequently noted that Rawls endorses normative
individualism domestically but rejects it internationally. (Normative
individualism is the view that, in settling moral questions, only the
interests of individual human beings should count.) This is an
asymmetry insofar as, in Rawls's domestic theory, the interests of
collectives (e.g., associations) are given no independent weight-are
considered only insofar as individuals choose and identify with them.
In Rawls's international theory, by contrast, peoples are recognized as
ultimate units of moral concern, that is, as collectives with interests
that are not reducible to interests of individual persons.
More remarkable than this divergence of Rawls's international
theory from its cosmopolitan competitors is his insistence that the
interests of individuals should not count at all for purposes of selecting
and justifying a particular set of rules governing state conduct. The
only thing that counts is each people's interest "to preserve [its]
equality and independence"1 as a stable well-ordered (i.e., liberal or
decent) society." What matters then is that any people ready and
willing to constitute itself as a well-ordered society should have the
economic means to do so. This may favor "provisions for ensuring
that in all reasonable liberal (and decent) societies people's basic
needs are met" 1 2-though the basic needs of members of the
remaining peoples (pointedly excluded by Rawls 3 ) are a different
matter. But beyond this, Rawls's international deliberators do not
care to what extent alternative plausible formulations of the laws of
peoples would result in individuals suffering from being very pooreither absolutely or relative to the citizens of other countries.
Rawls reaches his inegalitarian conclusions about international
justice, then, by means of an undefended and dramatic asymmetry:
While the interests of individual human beings are the only ones that
count within Rawls's domestic theory, such interests of individuals do
not count at all within his international theory. Rawls acknowledges
this point, at least in general terms, when he characterizes his
international original position as one "that is fair to peoples and not to
individual persons."' 4 But his later attempt to defend the exclusion of
individual interests by appeal to the desirability of accommodating
decent hierarchical societies 5 fails: Just as liberal societies are said to
be concerned for "the well-being of their citizens," 6 so decent
hierarchical societies are said to be committed to a common good idea

10. Id. at 41; see id. at 70.
11. Id. at 33, 69.
12. Id. at 38.
13. See Thomas W. Pogge, An EgalitarianLaw of Peoples, 23 Phil. & Pub. Aff.
195,209 (1994).
14. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 2, at 17 n.9.
15. Id. at 82-85.
16. Id. at 34.
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of justice that involves a concern for "the human rights and the good
of the people they represent. 1 7 If both types of domestic regime
manifest a concern for the interests of individuals, then why doesn't
the international original position incorporate a concern for at least
the jointly recognized individual interests, alongside the interest of
each people in maintaining a stable well-ordered domestic regime? If
the deliberators in the international original position gave even just a
little weight, for example, to the interest of individuals in the absolute
and relative socio-economic position they have an opportunity to
attain (an interest that is recognized in societies of both kinds), then
they would have reason to prefer global economic rules that tend to
moderate rather than aggravate international economic inequality. 8
III. THE STRUCTURAL ASYMMETRIES BETWEEN THE TWO
THEORIES

Let me turn to what I consider the most important asymmetries,
which have received little scholarly attention thus far. While the
domestic theory is three-tiered and institutional, the international
theory is two-tiered and interactional. What exactly are these
asymmetries, and what impact do they have on the conclusions Rawls
claims the parties would reach in the two cases?

Domestic Theory

International Theory

Parties in the original position

Parties in the original position

who select

who select

a public criterion of social justice
(Rawls's two principles and two
priority rules)
which selects

a scheme of international
rules
(Rawls's eight laws of peoples)

a basic-structure design for any
specific empirical context

17. Id. at 69.
18. I have raised this point in Section 3 of An EgalitarianLaw of Peoples, Pogge,
supra note 13, at 208-11, and so have subsequent commentators. But we are still
missing a plausible defense of Rawls on this point.
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In the domestic case, the parties are to adopt a public criterion of
justice which is to guide the design, reform, and adjustment of the
domestic institutional order within variable natural, historical,
cultural, and economic-technological circumstances.
In the
international case, the parties are asked to endorse particular
international rules directly.
The former, three-tier construction provides more flexibility for
adapting to diverse circumstances. It leaves important features of the
basic structure open while prescribing only the grounds on which they
should be settled in a given concrete context. Whether and to what
extent there should be private ownership in means of production, for
example, is to be settled pursuant to the difference principle by
examining which solution (satisfying the first and opportunity
principles) would engender the best socioeconomic floor.
Circumstances may change, of course, and citizens may then have
reason to re-organize the basic rules of their legal and political system
in order to maintain the security of the basic liberties or they may
have reason to re-organize the basic rules of their economic order so
as to keep the difference principle satisfied.
The latter, two-tier construction provides no such flexibility. The
members of Rawls's Society of Peoples are locked into a particular set
of rules which may well prove too rigid to fulfill their interests as
peoples under changing global circumstances. Perhaps there are
reasons favoring a two-tier construction. It could be said, for instance,
that the probability of errors and corrupt judgments is reduced when
political actors are constrained by rigid rules rather than by rules that
are to be adjusted, under the guidance of a public criterion of social
justice, to changing natural, historical, cultural, and economictechnological circumstances. But one would like to be told what these
reasons are and, especially, why they should be decisive in the
international, but not in the domestic, case.
The structural disanalogy leads to important substantive
differences. Consider the question to what extent members of one
generation should be made to bear the economic costs of decisions
made by their predecessors. Rawls's domestic theory rules out some
such costs completely, through the first and opportunity principles: All
members of society, no matter how irresponsibly their parents may
have behaved, have an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of
equal basic liberties as well as to fair equality of opportunity. Beyond
this, Rawls's domestic theory gives a flexible response: Social
institutions may allow persons to be selectively penalized for their
parents' failure to save, or for their parents' high fertility, only if and
insofar as such selective penalization-mainly through the greater
incentives it gives parents to behave responsibly-tends to raise the
socio-economic floor. The degree of such selective penalization
embodied in social rules may then need to be adjusted over time so as
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to track changes in parental dispositions. Social rules or institutions
are viewed as mere means, to be adjusted so as optimally to achieve
the ends specified in Rawls's criterion, which here is the end
prescribed by the difference principle.
Internationally, the same issue arises with regard to societies that
have a low rate of savings or a high birth rate. In this case, however,
Rawls asks directly what the rules should be and asserts that the costs
of decisions made by former members of a society should be borne
entirely by its present members. To impose any of these costs on
other societies "seems unacceptable."19 Here, again, one would like to
be told why a different response should be appropriate in the
international case. As it is, the difference in moral content is a
byproduct of an unexplained variation in the parties' task description,
which prevents them from adopting a flexible solution that would be
sensitive to empirical information about how much loss through moral
hazard would actually occur under global economic institutions
designed to have a moderating effect on international inequality.
In pressing this point, I am not dismissing Rawls's concern for the
moral significance of collective self-governance, which Stephen
Macedo stresses in his contribution to this volume. Nor am I denying
that collective self-governance plausibly requires the self-governing
collective to receive a disproportionate share of the benefits and
burdens deriving from its decisions.
Rather, I am adding two
thoughts.
First, even in Rawls's ideal world of exclusively well-ordered and
self-governing peoples, there may still be reasons to favor some
burden sharing so that especially poorer and weaker societies" bear
not the full consequences of their unfortunate decisions but only a
disproportionate share thereof. One such reason comes into play
when the consequences of crucial decisions made for a society would
be borne by persons who had no role in this decision-by later
generations, for instance, or by persons living at the bottom of a
decent hierarchical society and hence excluded from political
participation.
Another reason comes into play when the
consequences of crucial decisions made for a society are heavily
influenced by luck or other unforeseeable intervening causes. The
force of these reasons is widely recognized with regard to the
decisions of autonomous families, so why should they not be
applicable to societal decisions as well? And even where neither of
these reasons applies, our domestic institutions often mitigate even
19. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 2, at 117, 118.
20. In first approximation, we may think of the poorer societies as the ones with
lower gross national income per capita. Poverty contributes to weakness, but there
are other factors besides, such as low population, meager resources, inhospitable
climate, remote location (e.g., land-locked), feeble military potential and dominant
neighbors.
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self-caused hardships and disadvantages, for example through the tax
system or the personal bankruptcy law. (A person who is seriously
hurt through his own reckless conduct, for example, can claim some of
his medical expenses as an itemized deduction and, if he was blinded
by the accident, he can also claim a somewhat higher standard
deduction in future years.) As we have seen, Rawls's domestic theory
gives general support to such mitigation of costs that poor households
must bear as a result of their decisions and provides guidance for how
such mitigation should be structured in the light of empirical
knowledge about the actual impact of moral hazards. Why should the
international analogue to such mitigation be incompatible with selfgovernance or otherwise be unacceptable?
The second thought deepens and corrects the first by pointing out
that how great the costs of an unfortunate decision are, and what sorts
of burdens it might result in, depend importantly on the larger
institutional context in which this decision is made. Society can be
organized to recognize and enforce slavery or debt bondage. If it is,
then unfortunate decisions by parents can result in their children
growing up as slaves or virtual slaves, chained to looms or laboring in
underground mines. Or society can be so organized that no parental
decisions can deprive children of equal access to the national health
and education systems and hence of the opportunity to compete for
employment on nearly equal terms later in life. This contrast shows
that the burdens typically arising from unfortunate decisions are much
larger under some designs of the institutional order than under others,
even when the latter involve no quantifiable burden sharing or
regrettable loss in family autonomy.
The same holds also for the international realm, where the
collective self-governance Macedo celebrates is not seen as
diminished, for instance, by the fact that international lending rules do
not enable states to put up their historical treasures (let alone their
children) as loan collateral. Here is a more relevant contrast: The
international order can be so structured that the rules of the world
economy reflect the bargaining power of the various states, effectively
preventing poorer societies from achieving the rates of economic
growth that are easily available to richer ones; or this order can be
structured so that it, regardless of the distribution of power, maintains
fair and open markets that actually make it easier for poorer than for
richer societies to achieve high rates of economic growth. Even if (my
first thought notwithstanding) we accept the principle that national
populations ought to bear the "full consequences" of decisions they or
their ancestors had made, we can still opt for either of these two
contrasting institutional designs. Our choice of global order thus codetermines what the full consequences of national decisions are. The
latter design, when combined with the principle of full consequences,

2004]

INCOHERENCE& THEORIES OFJUSTICE

1749

would clearly engender much less hardship and inequality than would
the former.
The structural difference between the tasks Rawls assigns to the
parties in his domestic and international original positions is
associated with two distinct conceptions of economic justice. When
we reflect upon social rules directly, as Rawls does in the international
case, it may seem plausible to let participants themselves negotiate the
terms of their economic interactions: "2. Peoples are to observe
treaties and undertakings. 3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the
agreements that bind them."'2 To block the danger of excessive
poverty arising from such libertarian rule making, Rawls adds the rule
that "8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under
unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent
political and social regime. 22
But Rawls himself finds strong reason to reject such a mildly
constrained libertarianism in the domestic case. When a society's
economic order arises from free bargaining among its members, the
rich can use their greater bargaining power to shape and reshape this
order in their own favor, which enables them to expand their
advantage by capturing a disproportionate share of the social product.
As Rawls writes eloquently:
suppose we begin with the initially attractive idea that social
circumstances and people's relationships to one another should
develop over time in accordance with free agreements fairly arrived
at and fully honored. Straightaway we need an account of when
agreements are free and the social circumstances under which they
are reached are fair. In addition, while these conditions may be fair
at an earlier time, the accumulated results of many separate and
ostensibly fair agreements, together with social trends and historical
contingencies, are likely in the course of time to alter citizens'
relationships and opportunities so that the conditions for free and
fair agreements no longer hold.23
He warns of:
the tendency... for background justice to be eroded even when
individuals act fairly: the overall result of separate and independent
transactions is away from and not toward background justice. We
might say: in this case the invisible hand guides things in the wrong
direction and favors an oligopolistic configuration of accumulations
that succeeds in maintaining unjustified inequalities and restrictions
on fair opportunity.2 4
In the domestic case, Rawls demands that the rules of economic

21.
22.
23.
24.

Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 2, at 37.
Id.
John Rawls, Political Liberalism 265-66 (1996).
Id. at 267.
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interaction must not be shaped by free bargaining, but must rather be
designed and adjusted so as to minimize hardships and inequalities
and to preserve background justice.
Rawls seems to recognize that allowing the terms of economic
interaction to be shaped by free bargaining poses a threat to
background justice also in the international case.2 ' And it certainly
does. Consider a world, not unlike ours, in which 15% of humankind
live in developed countries, with average per capita GDP around
$30,000, and 85% live in underdeveloped countries, with average per
capita GDP around $1,200. Assume that all societies are either liberal
or decent and that the affluent societies honor their duty of assistance
whenever poverty threatens the well-orderedness of any society. In
this world, conventions and treaties are negotiated about trade,
investments, loans, patents, copyrights, trademarks, double taxation,
labor standards, environmental protection, use of seabed resources,
and much else. In many ways, all these agreements can be shaped to
be more or less favorable to various affected parties and, in particular,
shaped to be more favorable to affluent societies (and their citizens
and corporations) or to poor societies, whose respective interests will
tend to be closely aligned in regard to most issues. Here the affluent
societies, together controlling 82% of the global product and access to
the world's most lucrative markets, enjoy great superiority in
bargaining power, information, and expertise over the poor societies
as a group. Able and eager to exploit this superiority, they shape the
global economic order as much as possible to their own advantage and
capture the lion's share of the benefits from economic interaction.
The invisible hand guides things in the wrong direction, allowing the
affluent societies to achieve higher rates of growth in per capita GDP,
thereby further aggravating the discrepancy in bargaining power. All
this is amply familiar from the actual world: Between 1975 and 1997,
real per capita GDP increased 53% on average in the industrialized
countries and decreased 15% in the poorest countries.2 6 "The income
gap between the fifth of the world's people living in the richest
countries and the fifth in the poorest was 74 to 1 in 1997, up from 60 to
1 in 1990 and 30 to 1 in 1960. "127 Earlier estimates are 11 to 1 for 1913,
7 to 1 for 1870, and 3 to 1 for 1820.28

25. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 2, at 42-43.
26. United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 154
(1999).
27. Id. at 3.
28. Id.; see id. at 38. For disturbing evidence about the rise of interpersonal
inequality worldwide, see Branko Milanovic, True World Income Distribution, 1988
and 1993: First Calculation Based on Household Surveys Alone, 112 Econ. J. 51
(2002). Milanovic reports that, over the studied five-year period, "the bottom 5% of
the world grew poorer, as their real incomes decreased between 1988 and 1993 by
[25 percent!], while the richest quintile grew richer. It gained 12% in real terms, that
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Securing merely a fixed minimum, Rawls's duty of assistance does
not protect poor societies against skewed and deteriorating
international terms of economic interaction exacted from them
through the greater and increasing bargaining power of the affluent.
Rawls seems to see the problem when he writes that any "unjustified
distributive effects" of cooperative organizations need to be
corrected29 and even suggests that the international parties, going
beyond his official eight laws of peoples,3" "would agree to fair
standards of trade to keep the market free and competitive."3 1 But
how are we to judge whether distributive effects are "unjustified" or
trading arrangements "unfair"? To answer this question, Rawls
would need to provide a principle that assesses and adjusts the global
economic order in light of its distributive effects in the way his
difference principle assesses and adjusts the domestic economic order.
But Rawls specifically rejects any such principle without "a target and
a cutoff point" in the international case.32 He also rejects any
international analogue to a democratic process, which allows a
majority of citizens in a liberal society to restructure its economic
order if it favors the rich too much. The global economic order of
Rawls's utopia is then shaped by free bargaining and thus reflects, and
tends continuously to augment, the advantaged position of the
wealthier societies. The imposition of such an economic order is not
made right by the fact that those advantaged by it keep the
disadvantaged from falling below some minimum.
IV. DO THE ASYMMETRIES GET RAWLS THE RESULT HE WANTS?

We have seen that Rawls greatly helps his case against egalitarian
and/or cosmopolitan critics of his scheme of eight rules3 3 through three
important and unexplained departures from his domestic theory. Let
me recapitulate.
By conceiving his international theory interactionally, as seeking
rules of good conduct, Rawls sidelines what he correctly identifies,
within the domestic context, as the most important moral topic: the
design of the institutional order, which crucially shapes the character
of the relevant actors as well as the options and incentives they face.
It is undeniable that, today and in the foreseeable future, there is a
global institutional order that importantly affects the options and
incentives societies and their rulers face in their relations with one
another and even affects profoundly the domestic institutions and
is it grew more than twice as much as mean world income (5.7%)." Id. at 88. Per
capita incomes declined in all other quintiles. Id. at 75.
29. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 2, at 43, 115.
30. Id. at 37.
31. Id. at 43.
32. Id. at 115-19.
33. Id. at 37.
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cultures of especially the smaller and weaker societies. By allowing
this global order to be shaped and adjusted through free bargaining
among states, Rawls puts it almost entirely beyond moral assessment.
While Rawls's domestic theory gives weight only to individuals and
their interests, his international theory gives no weight to individuals
and their interests. To be sure, the recognized interest of peoples-to
preserve their equality and independence as a well-ordered (i.e.,
liberal or decent) society-may accord with the interest of individuals
to live in a well-ordered society whose equality and independence are
preserved. But individuals do have other interests as well, many of
which are relevant to formulating rules for the good conduct of states.
For example, individuals have an interest in avoiding severe poverty
(which they may well suffer even if their society is at or above Rawls's
assistance threshold). And the citizens of a society also have an
interest in being able to avoid very large discrepancies between their
own socio-economic level and that prevailing in more affluent
societies.
Rawls's domestic theory is three-tiered and, through the middle
tier, systematically incorporates sensitivity to empirical information
about the distributional effects of alternative feasible institutional
arrangements. His criterion of social justice makes explicit the point
or purpose of domestic social institutions and thus demands
systematic reflection about which basic structure design offers, in the
given circumstances, the best prospects in regard to that point or
purpose. Rawls's international theory, by contrast, is two-tiered and
so does not systematically incorporate information about the
empirical (statistical) effects of alternative formulations of the "Law
of Peoples."
Do these three unexplained departures from his domestic theory
enable Rawls to support his eight laws as the formulation that
representatives of liberal and decent peoples would agree upon
behind their veil of ignorance? Perhaps they do. Yet all he actually
offers in the text is the bald assurance that "the representatives of
well-ordered peoples simply reflect on the advantages of these
principles of equality among peoples and see no reason to depart from
them or to propose alternatives."34
In fact, such representatives do have reasons to propose
alternatives. As Rawls acknowledges, it is generally more difficult for
poor societies to maintain a stable well-ordered regime.
So
representatives of peoples, behind a veil of ignorance, have reason to
favor a more egalitarian scheme of economic cooperation under which
well-ordered societies would have a better chance of being
comfortably above the minimal threshold needed to maintain a wellordered regime.
Second, as Rawls does not concede, great
34. Id. at 41; see id. at 69.
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international inequalities breed corruption in the poorer countries,
where politicians and bureaucrats find that they have more to gain
from catering to the interests of rich foreign governments and
corporations than from promoting the interests of their own much
poorer compatriots. So representatives of peoples, behind a veil of
ignorance, have reason to favor a more egalitarian law of peoples that
will keep relative poverty of societies from becoming excessive.3 5
I think Rawls overlooks these points because he subscribes, usually
at least, to what I have called the purely domestic poverty thesis
("PDPT").36 The PDPT holds that peoples are masters of their own
fate, that the causes of national poverty and international inequality
are purely domestic:
[T]he causes of the wealth of a people and the forms it takes lie in
their political culture and in the religious, philosophical, and moral
traditions that support the basic structure of their political and social
institutions, as well as in the industriousness and cooperative talents
of its members, all supported by their37 political virtues .... Crucial
also is the country's population policy.
If a society does not want to be poor, it can curb its population growth
or industrialize 38 and, in any case, "if it is not satisfied, it can continue
to increase savings, or, if this is not feasible, borrow from other
members of the Society of Peoples. 39
Rawls is here prone to make two interrelated mistakes. First, like
many others, he infers from the great diversity in the economic and
political performance of developing countries that the persistence of
severe poverty is explained by domestic factors alone:40 When
societies fail to thrive, he writes, "the problem is commonly the nature
of the public political culture and the religious and philosophical
traditions that underlie its institutions. The great social evils in poorer
societies are likely to be oppressive government and corrupt elites."4
This reasoning is fallacious. It does not follow from great diversity in
35. See Pogge, supra note 13, § 4.
36. See Thomas W. Pogge, "Assisting" the Global Poor, in The Ethics of
Assistance: Morality and the Distant Needy (Deen K. Chatterjee ed., 2004).
37. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 2, at 108.
38. Id. at 117-18.
39. Id. at 114.
40. Id. at 108.
41. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (1993 essay version), reprintedin John Rawls:
Collected Papers 559 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999). Rawls is here echoing Michael
Walzer:
it is not the sign of some collective derangement or radical incapacity for a
political community to produce an authoritarian regime. Indeed, the history,
culture, and religion of the community may be such that authoritarian
regimes come, as it were, naturally, reflecting a widely shared world view or
way of life.
Michael Walzer, The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics, 9 Phil. &
Pub. Aff. 209, 224-25 (1980).
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the performance of my students that their learning success is due to
local (student-specific) factors alone, that the "global" factor of the
quality of my teaching has nothing to do with it. And the conclusion is
false, as I have already illustrated by adducing the impact of global
trading rules on the evolution of the international distribution of per
capita GDP.
Second, again like many others, Rawls overlooks how-especially
in the poorer, weaker countries-the domestic factors he cites are
themselves significantly shaped by global factors. Oppression and
corruption in the poor countries have been decisively encouraged and
entrenched through the tax-deductibility of bribes that multinational
corporations have paid to officials in the developing countries as well
as through the international resource and borrowing privileges I have
extensively discussed elsewhere.4"
So I conclude that, even if we accept the three unexplained
asymmetries and conduct the international original-position thought
experiment just the way Rawls wants it conducted, we still find that
the rational deliberators have reason to favor a more egalitarian
global order over one whose design is left to free bargaining among
states. To be sure, Rawls seems to have instructed the international
parties that they should aim for agreement on interactional rules of
good conduct rather than on the design of the global institutional
order. Even so, they can and would nonetheless adopt, as such a rule
of good conduct, that peoples should advocate and support a global
economic order that tends to mitigate international economic
inequality by affording better opportunities to achieve high rates of
economic growth to poorer than to richer societies. Whether poorer
societies take advantage of these superior opportunities would be, of
course, up to them.
V. ONE MORE UNEXPLAINED ASYMMETRY

I have tried to show that Rawls's international theory is in various
ways incoherent with his domestic theory of justice. There is one
further, quick way of supporting this same result. Developing his
domestic theory, Rawls writes: "At some level there must exist a
closed background system, and it is this subject for which we want a
theory."4 3 And so he assumes throughout, if only for purposes of "a
first approximation," ' that the society whose institutional order he
discusses is "self-contained,"4 5 "more or less self-sufficient,"46 and "a

42. See Thomas W. Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights:
Responsibilities and Reforms §§ V, 4.9, 6.2-4, 8.2.1 (2002).
43. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 23, at 272 n.9.
44. Id.
45. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1, at 401.
46. Id. at 4.

Cosmopolitan

2004]

INCOHERENCE & THEORIES OF JUSTICE

1755

closed system isolated from other societies. 4 7 The members of such a
society ought to structure it, he concludes, according to his public
criterion of justice (the two principles with the two priority rules).
Since the world at large seems to fit Rawls's stipulations, (being
self-contained, more or less self-sufficient, and a closed system
isolated from other societies)-certainly better than any national
societies do-how about structuring it in accordance with the public
criterion of social justice Rawls proposes in his domestic theory?
Rawls not only denies that we ought to do this, but even insists that
we ought not. But what reasons can he offer?
He could adduce his opposition to a world state. Rawls writes:
"Here I follow Kant's lead in PerpetualPeace (1795) in thinking that a
world government ...would either be a global despotism or else
would rule over a fragile empire torn by frequent civil strife as various
regions and peoples tried to gain their political freedom and
autonomy."4 8 Yet Kant's view on this question may not be the best
evidence one can have about whether a just world government is
feasible in the twenty-first century or beyond. Moreover, if Rawls
finds the view he attributes to Kant convincing, then he should have
incorporated it into his domestic theory, which should then require
that no society must grow beyond a certain population or area, or
perhaps beyond a certain percentage of the global population or land

47. Id. at 7.
48. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 2, at 36. Rawls is here giving an
unbalanced reading of Kant's late essay, which has this to say about a world republic:
For states in their relation to one another, there cannot be any reasonable
way out of their lawless condition which entails only war except that they,
like individual human beings, should give up their savage (lawless) freedom,
adjust themselves to public coercive laws, and thus establish a continuously
growing international state (civitas gentium), which will ultimately include all
the nations of the world. But under their idea of the law of nations they
absolutely do not wish to do this, and so reject in practice what is correct in
theory. If all is not to be lost, there can be, then, in place of the positive idea
of a world republic, only the negative surrogate of an alliance which averts
war, endures, spreads, and checks the force of that hostile inclination away
from law, though such an alliance is in constant peril of its breaking loose
again.
Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, in Kant's Political Writings 105 (H.B. Nisbet trans.,
Hans Reiss ed., 1995). The passage Rawls seems to have in mind says that a plurality
of independent states:
is still to be preferred to their amalgamation under a single power which has
overruled the rest and created a universal monarchy.
For the laws
progressively lose their impact as the government increases its range, and a
soulless despotism, after crushing the germs of goodness, will finally lapse
into anarchy.
Id. at 113.
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surface area.49 But Rawls's model of a liberal well-ordered society
contains no such limitations.
Finally, even if a just world government were infeasible, this would
not invalidate the application of Rawls's public criterion of social
justice worldwide: This criterion does not prescribe a certain
institutional order, but governs the comparative assessment of
alternative feasible such orders. Applied globally, it would instruct us
to design a global political order under which the basic liberties of all
human beings would be secure and a global economic order that
realizes fair equality of opportunity worldwide and permits
inequalities among persons only insofar as they raise the
socioeconomic floor. If a world government is not part of the best
arrangement (because it exposes the basic liberties of people to the
dangers of oppression and civil strife), then alternative institutional
arrangements must be considered-perhaps a world federation like
the one Kant envisioned or like the European Union.
Suppose a majority of the world's people wanted to design the
global institutional order according to the criterion of social justice
Rawls proposes for the domestic case, aiming for the global order that
comes closest to fulfilling this criterion. Why should it be wrong for
them to do this? This would be wrong, Rawls suggests, because it
would impose a global order designed according to a liberal criterion
of social justice upon decent peoples which may reject the normative
individualism of this criterion as well as its emphasis on basic liberties.
Rawls's own international theory is superior in this regard because,
rejecting normative individualism, it accommodates decent peoples
who are to be tolerated by liberals and welcomed as equal "members
in good standing of the Society of Peoples."0
Rawls's suggestion raises three questions. First, why should the
appropriate mutual accommodation between those who endorse and
those who reject normative individualism be a theory that rejects it?
Seeing how Rawls's international theory of justice disregards the basic
liberties of persons outside well-ordered societies, truncates the basic
liberties of persons in decent societies,5 1 and tolerates poverty and
huge inequalities worldwide, why should liberals find it appealing?
This problem could be mitigated by following my earlier suggestion
that the most important interests of persons should be represented in
the international original position alongside those of peoples.

49. Kant suggests such a limit, citing his concern for avoiding "the most fearful
despotism (as has indeed happened more than once with overly large states)." Id. at

90.
50. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 2, at 59.
51. Decent hierarchical societies, though they solicit the views of social groups
through a "decent consultation hierarchy," have no democratic procedures, id. at 7173, and may also, perhaps pursuant to a state religion, impose substantial and unequal
restrictions on freedom of expression and liberty of conscience, id. at 74.
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Second, why must the opponents of normative individualism be
accommodated in the design of the global institutional order but not
in the design of the domestic institutional order of a liberal society? If
global arrangements must "express liberalism's own principle of
toleration for other reasonable ways of ordering society," 52 then why
must not domestic arrangements also reflect such toleration by
instantiating some compromise between liberal and non-liberal
(communitarian) values? 3
This question leads naturally to the third: Is Rawls's insistence, that
the rules of good conduct for peoples must be hospitable to decent
societies, a matter of principle or is this insistence contingent on
historical facts, such as the existence and numerical strength of decent
societies? Rawls describes a fictional decent hierarchical society,
Kazanistan, in which normative individualism is rejected.5 4 But is the
mere possibility of such societies reason enough to accommodate
them in the design of the international original position and the
envisioned Society of Peoples-even if such accommodation
accommodates no living persons or peoples?
It is unclear how Rawls would answer this question. Either answer
would reveal a gap in his reasoning. To motivate an affirmative
answer, he would need to explain why an equal place should be
indefinitely preserved for such societies when Rawls himself deems
them morally flawed-"[a] decent hierarchical society.., does not
treat its own members reasonably or justly as free and equal
citizens" 5 5-and
defends accommodation by claiming that it
encourages decent societies to develop in a liberal direction. 6
A negative answer would leave a different gap, as Rawls gives no
evidence that there really are non-liberal societies that qualify as
decent and reject normative individualism. Contemporary defenses of
non-liberal societies often stress how happy and secure individuals
feel under their more authoritarian, communal, or moralizing social
institutions and how disorienting and alienating they find liberal ones.
Thus, justifications of decent regimes might well take the interests of
persons as morally fundamental. If actual decent regimes were so
justified, or if no such regimes existed, then a liberal commitment to
accommodate actual decent peoples would not support an

52. Rawls, The Law of Peoples,supra note 41, at 530.
53. I am here suggesting that Rawls's proposed Society of Peoples instantiates a
compromise between liberal and decent values. This suggestion may be too generous.
While the proposal compromises liberal values severely (as outlined in the preceding
paragraph), it is unclear whether it requires any concessions from decent hierarchical
societies at all. As far as I can see, they get the rules that best accord with their values
and interests.
54. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 2, at 75-78.
55. Id. at 83.
56. Id. at 61-62.
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international original position that represents peoples rather than
persons.
Rawls's proposed accommodation presupposes humanity's division
into mutually distinct and culturally cohesive peoples.
Is this
presupposition meant to reflect a moral valuation or entrenched
empirical facts? Again, either possibility leads into difficulty. The
former answer is problematic, because A Theory of Justice expresses
the opposite moral view. The latter answer is problematic as well,
because Rawls makes no effort to show that his concept of a people
reflects general and entrenched facts in the contemporary world.
Many borders in Africa, Latin America, and Asia are colonial
constructs that lump diverse communities together (Indonesia) while
splitting others over two or more states (Kurds). In Europe, borders
are rapidly losing practical significance, so that the notion of a people
seems increasingly ill-fitted to the old groups (the Dutch and the
Danes) and ill-fitted also to the new and still expanding population of
the European Union. In the midst of globalization, we can easily
imagine a broadening of this trend, leading to a world in which most
borders have little political and practical significance or do not
correlate with "separate languages, religions, and cultures."57
The status of Rawls's account remains then unclear: Calling his
Society of Peoples a "realistic utopia," does he propose it as the
highest ideal for the indefinite future? Or is it a stopgap model meant
to accommodate, so long as they are still around, some slightly
backward but still basically passable societies that are best handled
with tolerance and equal respect-a stopgap model to be superseded,
in a hoped-for future era when nearly all societies will have become
liberal, by a genuinely liberal conception of global justice? Perhaps
The Law of Peoples is not meant to be clear on this point. The
accommodation of decent societies can have its desired effects only if
it is genuine and unconditional, only if decent societies feel assured
that their equal place is secure indefinitely irrespective of their
number or power.5 8
This parallels the liberal domestic
accommodation of diverse comprehensive (e.g., religious) doctrines.
But there are two crucial differences: Rawls expresses no preferences
within the range of reasonable comprehensive doctrines and he
predicts that, barring state oppression, citizens will continue to hold
and to respect doctrines throughout this range." In the international
case, by contrast, Rawls holds that decent societies are morally
inferior and hopes that all human beings will eventually live under
liberal institutions. Ought the humanity of such a happy future age

57. Id. at 112.
58. See id. at 122-23.
59. The "fact of reasonable pluralism." Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 23,
at 36.
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share his concern to maintain a global order fully acceptable and
hospitable to decent regimes? It may seem wise to leave this issue
unexplored.
CONCLUSION

My disagreements with Rawls's views on international justice are
deep and long-standing. Still, I am most grateful to him for having
worked so hard, under most adverse conditions, to give us a final and
full articulation of these views. I am also very glad that he formally
incorporated the duty of assistance into his The Law of Peoples. °
This duty, suitably specified, supports a critique of most of the more
affluent societies today for doing far too little toward enabling the
poorer societies to be well-ordered. Given the magnitude of their
failure and indifference, this critique might well qualify those
wealthier societies as "outlaw states" in Rawls's sense.
Still, this important insight should not obscure the even more
important point that these affluent societies are not merely helping
too little, but also harming too much: by imposing a global
institutional order under which, foreseeably and avoidably, nearly half
of humankind are still living in abject poverty and about one-third of
all human deaths are still from poverty-related causes.61

60. This duty was not listed in the earlier essay. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra
note 41, at 540.
61. According to the latest figures available from the World Bank, 2.8 billion out
of a total of 5.9 billion human beings were in 1998 living below the $2/day poverty
line, which corresponds to an annual income with the purchasing power that $785.76
had in the US in 1993. See Shaohua Chen & Martin Ravallion, How Did the World's
Poorest Farein the 1990s?, 47 Rev. Income & Wealth 283, 290 (2001). These 47% of
the world's population live on about 1 % of the global social product. See World
Health Organization, The World Health Report 2002 annex tbl. 2. (2002), available at
http://www.who.int/whr/20O2/en/; see also supra note 36.
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